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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 It has been called the greatest generation gap since the early days of rock and roll.1  
And, like that famous gap, it is fueling a moral panic that threatens to obscure the value 
of a new form of community and self-expression. 
¶2 Participants in online social networking sites (OSNs) such as MySpace2 and 
Facebook3 (among hundreds of others) revel in the freedom and communion facilitated 
by the burgeoning social Internet.  They often express offense or a feeling of intrusion 
when their online personae are discovered by meddling parents, employers, or other 
unintended audiences.  Meanwhile offline, the uninitiated and sometimes older 
generation, fueled by the dizzying media chatter regarding sexual predation, 
pornography, and cyber-bullying on OSNs,4 scoff at their protectorate’s foolhardy 
disclosure of personal stories, images, and information online, concluding that these will 
inevitably invite social and professional disgrace.  They accuse OSN participants of being 
ignorant of the technology’s risks, not caring about privacy, or having poor judgment.  
Moreover, some subscribe to the notion that online privacy is non-existent and its 
protection, whether legal or practical, is therefore futile. 
¶3 It is only by sidestepping the predominant fear and mistrust of the technology and 
objectively understanding the often generation-specific conceptualizations of privacy that 
we can expose the shortcomings in this area and inform new law, ethics, and technology 
that can apply to modern harms. 
¶4 To that end, Section II provides a brief overview of online social networking 
phenomena and outlines some of its real and perceived threats.  Section III lays out the 
current privacy debate between two camps: the net-savvy users of the medium who 
 
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Miami School of Business Administration.  B.A., 
Duke University, 1996; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2000. 
1 Emily Nussbaum, Say Everything, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Feb.  12, 2007, at 24, available at 
http://www.nymag.com/news/features/27341.   
2 MySpace.com is a registered trademark of MySpace, Inc.  For ease of reference, this article refers to 
MySpace as exemplary of OSNs. 
3 Facebook.com is a registered trademark of Facebook, Inc. 
4 See, e.g., Julia Angwin, How Safe Are the Top Social-networking Sites for Teens?, WALL ST. J., Jul. 
24, 2006, at R10; Alex Kumi, Porn and Bullying Common on MySpace and Bebo, says Which?, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), Sept. 14, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2006/sep/14/news.uknews; 
Kevin Poulsen, MySpace Predator Caught by Code, WIRED, Oct. 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/10/71948;  Susanna Schrobsdorff, Predator’s 
Playground, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2006, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/47351; Greg Toppo, 
High-tech Bullying May Be on the Rise, USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 2006, at 8D; MySpace: Your Kids’ 
Danger?, CBS News, Feb. 6, 2006, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/06/eveningnews/main1288944.shtml. 
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ground their formulation of privacy in anonymity versus the physical-world generation 
who find privacy in control over their personal information.  Unfortunately for both, 
neither complete anonymity nor control is possible online.  To date, as Section IV 
describes, the law has embraced the notion of privacy as control over information, thus 
detrimentally focusing the burden of protecting and adjudicating on the technology’s 
users.  In order to allow the medium to flourish positively and accommodate the new 
privacy challenges, we must redefine the need for it.  Section V posits five reasons why 
privacy and personality should be protected on OSNs and other digital media.  The article 
concludes that the burdens of this protection should be borne by all and offers 
suggestions on how this can be accomplished. 
II. UNDERSTANDING ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
¶5 If MySpace alone were a country and each of its profiles a person, it would be the 
12th most populous nation in the world.5  The overwhelming magnitude and success of 
OSNs lies in their unprecedented ability to provide a platform for self-identification, 
communication, and their unique ability to mimic human intimacy.  The ease with which 
profiles can be created and updated facilitates disclosure and self-invention within a 
perceived community. 
¶6 Participants in the most ubiquitous OSNs, primarily teenagers and young adults,6 
need only a valid e-mail account to set up a profile or page.  A profile is a multimedia 
collage that serves as one’s digital “face” in cyberspace using images, video, audio, and 
links to other profiles and websites.  A high tech cross between a bumper sticker and a 
diary, digital profiles commonly broadcast personal philosophies and preferences, as well 
as everything from artistic creations to the mundane details of everyday life.  Profiles can 
be adjusted to be public or private, depending on its author’s intended audience.  Public 
profiles are searchable and visible to anyone in cyberspace, while accessibility to private 
profiles is by invitation only. 
¶7 These managed identities are linked together by real-world relationships and OSN 
ties to form a network of “friends.”  Through these networks of associated profiles, OSN 
participants can post or exchange photographs and video, send messages to friends 
instantaneously, join interest groups dedicated to virtually any topic, and leave notes on 
their friends’ profiles that are visible by anyone with access to the profile.  As such, self-
disclosure is the currency and the means that participants use to “hang out” on OSNs.  
According to a recent study conducted by the Pew Internet Project, the majority of OSN 
users generally believe that sharing gossip and personal information about themselves on 
OSNs is acceptable.  7
 
5 MySpace boasts over 100 million users worldwide.  Patricia Sellers, MySpace Cowboys, FORTUNE, 
Sept. 4, 2006, at 66.  Population-wise, it would fall between Mexico (with a population of approximately 
106 million) and the Philippines (with a population of approximately 88 million).  UNITED NATION 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2006 REVISION, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/wpp2006_highlights_rev.pdf.   
6 According to marketing firms, only 10 percent of participants in OSNs are over the age of 55 and close 
to 50 percent are under 35.  Press Release, comScore, Inc., Demographic Profile of Visitors to Select Social 
Networking Sites, available at http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1019. 
7 Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Teens, Privacy & Online Social Networks: How Teens Manage 
their Online Identities and Personal Information in the Age of MySpace, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE 
PROJECT, Apr. 18, 2007, at 20, available at 
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¶8 However, the hallmarks of digital information and the ease of informational 
exchange facilitated by this medium lead to more noxious privacy and personality harms 
than ever before.  Privacy law has traditionally been criticized for not having “enough 
dead bodies.”8  While this corporeal metaphor no longer applies, privacy harms are no 
longer short-lived and innocuous.  The information’s digital permanence, searchability, 
replicability, transformability, and multitude of often unintended audiences make its 
effects more damaging than ever.  Lacking the relative transience of human memory, the 
digital record has increased the stakes of privacy today, as Professor Larry Lessig has 
pointed out.9  Moreover, technology allows individuals to troll for information to which 
they would otherwise never have had access and increases the risk that information may 
be seen and interpreted by multiple invisible audiences.10  This invites readings divorced 
from the information’s original context and conclusions that may be erroneous, 
discriminatory, and often irrefutable.  Further, it allows third parties to manipulate and 
further disseminate information or images without the editorial lens of professional ethics 
or individual accountability. 
¶9 A person’s digital dossier can betray him in the physical world, resulting in harms 
like the denial or loss of employment,11 shame and embarrassment, denigration of 
reputation, or merely exposure in an unwanted light.  Harmful postings can be 
intentionally so, as with ex-lovers who vengefully post nude pictures or embarrassing 
information to harass their former flames,12 or the many students who have sought to 
disgrace their teachers with false MySpace profiles defaming them as pedophiles or 
sexual deviants.13  And they can also be unintentionally damaging, as with the many 
anecdotal cases in which the innocent posting of pictures of social activism,14 risky 
behavior,  or controversial opinions15 16 cause their subjects to lose a job, a new 
relationship, or a respectable reputation. 
 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Privacy_SNS_Report_Final.pdf.  Interestingly, most agree 
that while gossip about others is okay to share, personally identifying information about themselves, like 
their own personal medical information, is almost never okay to share. 
8 Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease about Privacy Law: In Response to Daniel J  Solove, A Taxonomy of 
Privacy, (2006), http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/response.php?rid=3. 
9 Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56 (1999). 
10 danah boyd, Social Network Sites: Public, Private, or What?, KNOWLEDGE TREE 13, May 2007,  
http://kt.flexiblelearning.net.au/tkt2007/?page_id=28.   
11 See Donald C. Davis, MySpace Isn’t Your Space (The Berkeley Electronic Press, Working Paper No.  
1943, 2007), http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1943 (calling for a fortification of employment law in the 
face of the widespread practice of passing judgment on potential job candidates based on OSN background 
checks). 
12 Benz v. Washington Newspaper Publishing Co., 2007 WL 1794104 at *1 (D.D.C. Sept.  29, 2006); 
see also Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 24. 
13 For example, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23406, at *1-2 (D. Pa. 
2007), a fourteen-year-old created a false profile for his school principal on MySpace.com.  The profile 
described him as a bisexual pedophile whose interests included “fucking in his office” and “hitting on 
students and their parents.”  Id. at *2.    
14 Diane Coutu, HBR Case Study and Commentary: We Googled You, HARV. BUS. REV., Jun. 2007, at 37 
(discussing the effects of a hypothetical young woman’s social activism online on her future job prospects). 
15 Associated Press, Captions, Not Photos, Trouble Miss New Jersey, MSNBC, Jul. 11, 2007, available 
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19620261/ (detailing a blackmail threat to Miss New Jersey that involved 
pictures taken from her private Facebook page). 
16  Michelle Kaufman & Sarah Rothschild, Space Invasion, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 30, 2006, at D1 
(reporting that reputation-wary college athletic departments have prohibited their athletes from engaging in 
OSN communications). 
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III. THE DIGITAL PRIVACY DEBATE:  NATIVES VERSUS  IMMIGRANTS 
¶10 Privacy expectations on OSNs seem to be overwhelmingly generation specific.  As 
Professor John Palfrey put it, cyberspace can be divided between digital natives, those 
who grew up with the Internet, and digital immigrants, the older generation who have 
practically (but not always philosophically) immigrated to it.17  This distinction frames 
the debate regarding the very existence of privacy online.  Deconstructing each side’s 
assumptions reveals their biases, their varying levels of dependence and reliance on the 
technology as safeguard, and ultimately, I argue, their fundamental conceptual 
differences regarding privacy. 
¶11 The digital natives take advantage of their online existence and take MySpace’s 
name to heart: for them, it really is about their personal space that is unmediated and free.  
Although accused of a having poorly developed sense of the risks inherent in the 
technology, digital natives, by virtue of being raised in an Internet-immersed culture, are 
extremely cyber-savvy.  Although accused of reckless apathy when it comes to privacy, 
digital natives are wont to cry out when their privacy is breached.  18
¶12 To appreciate their ethos, consider this physical space analogy: all automobile 
drivers know that they are in public when they drive on public streets.  As such, in the 
absence of opaquely tinted windows, they do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy from other’s glances or scrutiny while driving.  Somewhat inexplicably, however, 
drivers often tend to do things that they otherwise wouldn’t do in public, such as picking 
their teeth or their noses, belting out show tunes, or talking to themselves.  This is 
because most of the time, while driving, drivers are not expecting to have a wide 
audience.  It is possible that this figment of privacy is created by the automobile 
technology itself: the shell of metal and glass that encases them.  Drivers’ false sense of 
privacy can also be created by their perception of their minute place within the vastness 
of the hectic public sphere.  They find privacy through the anonymity granted by the lack 
of attention (they imagine) is focused on them.  Finally contributing to the drivers’ sense 
of privacy is the inherent assumption that, even if the driver next door is staring at them, 
chances are very small that it is someone they know.  In other words, no one knows me, 
no one cares, and no one is focusing on me. 
¶13 Some of the time, however, drivers use their cars to express their personalities or 
garner attention from certain perceived audiences.  They might try to look cool with one 
 
17 John G. Palfrey, Jr., Commentary: We Googled You, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2007, at page 5 
(distinguishing digital natives from digital immigrants).  I concede that this grouping inevitably results in 
generalizations, as there are certainly cyber-savvy octogenarians and teenagers who have never been 
online.  However, for the purposes of this article, Professor Palfrey’s clever distinction serves us well.   
18 The development and refinement of enhanced privacy technologies on OSNs has been driven in large 
part by consumers protesting privacy breaches.  Facebook, for example, has responded to public outcries 
with changes to their privacy controls, features, and settings.  For example,when Facebook introduced a 
new features called “News Feed” and “MiniFeed,” widespread anger and pervasive protest among its users 
prompted swift reactions and changes to the website’s privacy functions.  Originally designed to make it 
easier for friends to keep up to date with each other, these features had resulted in the bombardment of 
disclosure of trivially personal information such as the initiation of a new relationship or the posting of a 
new photo by a friend.  Ultimately, the privacy controls were recoded and users were permitted to choose 
which types of personal stories became available to MiniFeed and News Feeds.  See, e.g., John Leyden, 
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hand on the wheel and music blaring as they cruise in front of their peers on a Saturday 
night or drive fast to showcase their automobiles’ capabilities.  This is behavior in which 
they wouldn’t necessarily engage in the presence of a police officer, their mother, or 
employer.  They might also display religious, academic, national, social, or political 
affiliations on their bumper stickers (as in “My child is an Honor Student at XYZ 
Elementary”) or decorate their cars with words, neon lights, stickers identifying the 
composition of their families, or even memorials to the deceased.  These expressions of 
individual identity, although publicly visible, may not necessarily be for everyone’s eyes.  
Of course, the parents of the honor student wouldn’t want to divulge that information to a 
pedophile or a stalker, who can easily conclude the child’s whereabouts. 
¶14 Like automobile drivers, digital natives’ complex expectations of privacy on OSNs 
rest on a combination of technology, the anonymity of the multitude, and assumptions 
about the presence of their unintended audiences.  While young digitals know on some 
level that their online behavior is ultimately subject to the unforgiving scrutiny of the 
Internet, they demand the right to exercise their situational personalities and still be 
shielded from unintended audiences.  Theirs is a conception of privacy rooted in their 
perceived entitlement of selective anonymity. 
¶15 Digital immigrants, on the other hand, grew up in a world where they had the 
luxury of control over their information.  Their era gave them the opportunity to 
successfully rewrite their personal histories through legal and social mechanisms: 
criminal records could be expunged, foolish marriages could be annulled, shameful 
teenage pregnancies could be covered up by “moving away,” and all was forgotten.  In 
their youth, newspapers yellowed and memories failed, leaving only the person’s word as 
evidence (i.e., the laughably exonerating, “I smoked marijuana but never inhaled” ). 19
¶16 To the digital immigrant, OSN privacy is an absurd oxymoron.  After all, it’s the 
Internet! When faced with the privacy-related risks of the medium, digital immigrants 
fervently argue, “if you can’t stand the heat, get off of MySpace.”  This argument is 
consistent with their history of control over their personal information and the control-
centered definitions of privacy of their generation’s noted legal scholars.  20
¶17 Disturbingly for the digital immigrants, the digital medium has eviscerated an 
individual’s control over her personal information.  This is true whether the person self-
posted on an OSN, made a purchase with a credit card, or was surreptitiously 
photographed with a camera phone while walking on a public street and exposed on a 
video sharing site.  While the control argument has some merit when applied to those 
who do not protect their personal information — either by password or by the OSN 
security features — it fails when applied to the many others who are the reluctant 
subjects of online discussions and photographs.  This argument assumes that the victim of 
 
19 During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton was quoted as saying: “But when I was in 
England I experimented with marijuana a time or two, and I didn’t like it.  I didn’t inhale it, and never tried 
it again.”  Gwenn Ifill, The 1992 Campaign: New York; Clinton Admits Experimenting With Marijuana in 
1960’s, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1992, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE0DF1F38F933A05750C0A964958260. 
20 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. J. 475, 482 (1968) (“[Privacy] is the control we have over 
information about ourselves.”); Alan F. Westin, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM  7 (1967) (“Privacy is the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others.”). 
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a personality or privacy breach has full control over what is posted of her and that she 
was the original discloser of the information.  This assumption is simply not valid in 
world where ubiquitous tiny cameras can easily capture and widely disseminate images 
without consent or bloggers can unilaterally defame individuals without opportunity for 
rebuttal or editorial restraint. 
¶18 Unfortunately for the digital natives, so too has the digital medium erased the 
possibility of anonymity and concealment from unintended audiences.  While both sides 
are fundamentally mistaken in their assumptions, it is possible, however, that digital 
natives are ahead of the curve in recognizing that the Internet is more likely to grant them 
selective anonymity than control over their information.  This notion informs anonymity 
as the foundation of their conception of privacy.  Unfortunately, the privacy law, 
technology, and ethics have not caught up to the harms they purportedly protect and 
redress. 
IV. THE LAW AS DIGITAL IMMIGRANT 
¶19 The digital immigrant formulation of privacy as control has pervaded the 
development (or lack thereof) of the law and technology that protects online socializers 
from privacy and personality harms.  It is rooted in a simplistic notion of privacy as 
control over personal information and the mistaken assumption that such control is 
possible on- or off-line.  This ill-fitting and impossible conception of privacy places the 
burden of “remaining private” squarely on the individual, who is ultimately without 
recourse from existing law or technology (as personified by its creators and 
disseminators, the Internet Service Providers (ISPs)) in the event they are harmed. 
A. Tort Law Provides Limited Recourse to the Shamed 
¶20 In tort law and beyond, the notion of “privacy as control” is reflected in a focus on 
assumption of risk.  In other words, those who have exposed themselves to the public eye 
cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in their exposure.  Categorically, 
everyone would agree that those who carelessly post shameful pictures of themselves or 
incriminating information on profiles that are accessible to everyone on the Internet 
cannot reasonably claim privacy in their posting.21  Regardless of what the moral panic’s 
fomenters may fear, this is likely a very small percentage of OSN participants. 
¶21 For those who did not affirmatively seek publicity or even tried assiduously to 
avoid it by staying offline, tort law provides limited atonement for cybershame.  In fact, 
causes of action that primarily protect one’s reputation, dignity, or privacy — such as 
defamation, privacy torts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress — have 
traditionally been both anemic and anomalous, due in part to the lack of tangible or 
gaugeable harm of the dignitary injuries they address.   The following actions are often 22
 
21 A recent Ohio child custody case exemplifies this point.  In Dexter v. Dexter, the mother seeking 
custody of her child had detailed her drug usage and incriminating innermost thoughts on her MySpace 
profile, including statements that she was “on a hiatus from using illicit drugs during the pendency of [the 
child custody] proceedings, but that she planned on using drugs in the future.” 2007 Ohio 2568, P32-33 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2007).  The court wisely concluded that she could “hardly claim an expectation of privacy 
regarding these writings.”  Id. at  n.4. 
22 See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 598, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861) (famously noting that “mental pain 
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stymied after a balancing the aggrieved’s evanescent humiliation with the actor’s 
formidable First Amendment rights.  23
¶22 The torts of defamation — libel and slander — do not apply if the information 
published was true or opinion, however harrowing.24  Thus, if the disclosure is true but 
nonetheless embarrassing or meant for other audiences, these dignitary torts are 
inapplicable.  Moreover, their prosecution is wrought with serious practical hurdles: the 
actor’s anonymity could make it difficult to find a defendant, the aggrieved parties must 
bring suit against the actual publisher of the information, not the ISP,25 and bringing suit 
could bring more negative and unwanted publicity than remuneration.  For example, one 
recently publicized case involved a lawyer, a scorned ex-girlfriend, and a website called 
dontdatehimgirl.com, which invites women to “dish dirt” on ex-lovers in a social 
networking context.  Prompted by the site’s vengeful mission, the ex-girlfriend publicly 
posted that the attorney had cheated on her and was infected with a venereal disease.26  
The lawyer then sued the elusive woman.  While the future of this case remains 
uncertain,27 a trial surely will submit the plaintiff to further embarrassment since he will 
have to prove that he was somehow faithful and healthy.  Regardless of legal redress, 
veracity, or the aggrieved’s opportunity to refute, the harm to his reputation is likely to be 
indelible. 
¶23 What if, however, it was true that the dontdatehimgirl.com plaintiff had a sexually 
transmitted disease? What if an embarrassing moment was surreptitiously captured on 
video and publicly posted by someone other than its subject on a video-sharing site such 
as YouTube.com? 
¶24 Prosser’s four-fold privacy torts — intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of 
private facts, false light privacy, and appropriation28 — are similarly fragile in the face of 
such disclosures.  The tort of intrusion upon seclusion addresses harmful information-
gathering, but not the subsequent disclosure of its fruits.29  It would only apply if the 
information was uncovered in a furtive way from a place within which the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, such as a home,  hotel room,  a tanning booth,  or a 30 31 32
 
or anxiety the law cannot value”). 
23 Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524, 550 (1989). 
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. j (1977). 
25 See infra note 51 and discussion of the Communications Decency Act. 
26 Man Fights Back After Appearing on Dontdatehimgirl.com: Local Man Says Entries Are False, 
WPXI.COM, June 8, 2006, http://www.wpxi.com/news/9343498/detail.html; Laura Parker, Court Says 
Blogs Not Liable for 3rd Parties Calif. Ruling also Covers Site Owners, USA Today, Nov. 22, 2006; 
Lawsuits Aim at Libelous Bloggers, DAILY RECORD (St. Louis), Oct. 28, 2006.   
27 Hollis v. Joseph, No. GD06-12677 (Pa. C.P. Alleghany, Apr. 5, 2007).  The attorney, Todd Hollis, 
also sued the Florida-based website itself for soliciting the negative comments.  This lawsuit was dismissed 
by the Pennsylvania court on jurisdictional grounds.  Joe Mandak, Judge Tosses Date Dissing Web Suit, 
MSNBC, Apr. 11, 2007, available at http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/18044225.   
28 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960). 
29 Intrusion upon seclusion requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant (a) intentionally intruded, 
physically or otherwise, (b) on the solitude or seclusion of another or on his private affairs or concerns, (c) 
in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
30 Dietmann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Welsh v. Pritchard, 241 P.2d 816 (Mont. 
1952).   
31 Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365 (1921). 
32 Sabrina W. v. Willman, 540 N.W.2d 364 (Neb. Ct. App., 1995) (noting that the “tanning room in the 
hair salon had a door which locked from the inside” in concluding that defendant intruded upon the 
seclusion of plaintiff when he secretly watched and photographed her in various stages of undress and 
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shopping bag.33  The tort also clearly encompasses the activities of high tech Peeping 
Toms, as it covers “unwarranted sensory intrusions like eavesdropping, wiretapping, and 
visual or photographic spying.”34  However, if the reluctantly photographed and 
“YouTube-ed” was not in seclusion, but rather in front of a classroom full of students35 or 
a city street,36 no court would hold that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy — 
regardless of his own expectation of “audience.”  37
¶25 The tort of public disclosure of private facts similarly rejects the notion of a 
“reasonable expectation of audience.”  The tort provides redress for the unwarranted 
publication of truthful but non-newsworthy, private, and offensive facts.38  However, 
courts often take the stringent stance that once information has been disclosed or exposed 
by its subject, it is no longer legally protectable as private.  Some courts have disqualified 
the privacy of information that had been disclosed to one other person or to individuals 
within the aggrieved’s intimate circle39 and courts have uniformly held that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in public places.40  In today’s legal and technological 
world, telling one can literally mean telling the world. 
¶26 The tort of false light privacy, a first cousin of defamation that focuses on 
protecting the plaintiff’s peace of mind rather than reputation, requires the injurious 
publication to have been published with knowledge of its falsity in addition to being false 
or misleading and highly offensive in nature.41  As with the other privacy torts, an action 
for false light privacy must involve matters that are inherently private.  As such, any 
matter that has been divulged to others or is visible from a public place is not actionable, 
no matter how offensive its repercussions.  42
¶27 Appropriation, the last of the four traditional privacy torts, is uniquely property-
focused and does not involve a false statement or a shameful disclosure.  Instead, the tort 
focuses on the unpermitted commercial use of a person’s identity and its ensuing 
 
nude). 
33 Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959).   
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B com. b, illust. 1-5 (1977).
35 Requa v. Kent School District, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40920 (D. Wash. 2007). 
36 Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433; 434 N.E.2d 1319; 449 N.Y.S.2d 941; 1982 N.Y. 
LEXIS 3203; 8 Media L. Rep. 1351 (N.Y. Court of Appeals 1982) (holding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when a man was photographed on a city street and featured on the cover of the New York Times 
Magazine). 
37 But c.f., M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511-12 (2001) (finding that Little League 
players and coaches had a privacy claim against Time Warner after HBO showed the team’s group photo in 
a story about the team manager’s molestation of several pictured team members). 
38 According to the Restatement, the disclosure tort requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant (a) 
gave publicity, (b) to a private fact, (c) that is not of legitimate concern to the public, where such disclosure 
(d) is highly offensive to a reasonable person.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
39 Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr.  665 (1984) (holding that the fact that the plaintiff had 
confided to a group of people that he was homosexual vitiated the matter’s privacy). 
40 According to the Restatement, “the plaintiff cannot normally complain when his or her photograph is 
taken while he or she is walking down the public street and is published in the defendant’s newspaper.  Nor 
is the plaintiff’s privacy invaded when the defendant gives publicity to a business or activity in which the 
plaintiff is engaged in dealing with the public.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). 
41 W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 863-868 (5th ed. 1984). 
42 See Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (denying the false light 
claim of a person who was photographed in line outside of an unemployment office, resulting in the 
implication that he was unemployed, regardless of the fact that he was only there as a translator).  See also 
Floyd v. Park Cities People, Inc. 685 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App. 1985) (holding that plaintiff did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy while standing on his front porch). 
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dignitary harms.43  Hence it would only apply if the plaintiff’s information or image were 
used without his consent for the defendant’s commercial purposes.  For example, 
Facebook has recently launched a platform called Social Ads that allows advertisers to 
use pictures of Facebook members in advertisements without their prior consent.44  While 
the tort of appropriation has not been tested in the OSN context, it seems likely that it 
would be applicable in this recent case. 
¶28 Finally, intentional infliction of emotional distress is ineffectual.  According to the 
Restatement, “one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress” will be liable for its emotional or physical 
manifestations.45  This has traditionally been a parasitic tort with more academic 
hullabaloo than real-world success.  Most courts have held that actionable conduct must 
exceed all reasonable and socially-tolerable bounds of decency.  This has set a high bar 
for the tort.  Actionable conduct should “arouse resentment against the actor”46 on the 
part of a civilized and decent community member and further “lead him to exclaim, 
‘Outrageous!’”47  In an online environment where individuals voluntarily release sex 
tapes to promote their careers  or “fart their way into the spotlight”48 49 for a chance at 
fleeting cyber-stardom, one may be hard pressed to find “outrageous!” conduct, much 
less define “community member.”  Moreover, many courts have held that physical 
manifestations of the emotional distress are necessary, thus further diluting the disgrace-
focused tort.  50
¶29 Interestingly, intellectual property law might be the only effective legal mechanism 
to stop further dissemination of embarrassing images online.  In the event that the 
individual who posted an incriminating or shameful photograph or video is not its owner, 
the owner can send a takedown notice to the ISP pursuant to the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.  51
B. The ISPs and the Technology Provide Limited Recourse to the Shamed 
¶30 In the absence of robust law protecting against reputational injury, there is a void in 
preventative measures and dispute resolution mechanisms for these matters.  The OSNs 
themselves shun the role of judge and jury in relational disputes.  In fact, they too have 
adopted the premise of privacy as control, thereby focusing responsibility for these 
privacy and personality harms on the OSN participants.  For example, one of Facebook’s 
core privacy principles states, “you should have control over your personal 
 
43 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:61 (2d ed. 2007). 
44 Kenneth Corbin, Facebook Ads: An Illegal Revolution?, INTERNET NEWS, Nov. 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3710341. 
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). 
46 Id. cmt. d. 
47 Id. 
48 Lola Ogunnaike, Sex, Lawsuits, and Celebrities Caught on Tape, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/fashion/sundaystyles/19tapes.html (noting that “gone are 
the days when a sex tape - which might seem the most embarrassing of disclosures  - automatically 
destroys a celebrity’s career.”). 
49 Nussbaum, supra note 1. 
50 KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, §12, at 64. 
51 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (1999). 
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information.”52  As mentioned above, this conceptualization of privacy is based on a 
sense of control that is not consistent with the transferability and malleability of the 
digital form. 
¶31 The ISP’s lack of involvement stems from strong public policy favoring ISP 
immunity for third party postings.  In the interest of maintaining the free flow of 
discourse without fear of liability, section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 
1996 insulates ISPs such as OSNs53 from liability for any tortious postings by a third-
party user or any harm flowing from the dissemination of that content.54  Regardless of 
this legislative grant of immunity, OSN’s terms and conditions generally contain clauses 
prohibiting the submission of material that is, among other things, defamatory or libelous 
or contravening an individual’s privacy and publicity rights.55  On the other hand, the 
same terms and conditions include seemingly contradictory releases from liability for 
“inaccurate, offensive, indecent, or objectionable” postings.  56
¶32 While some OSNs might accede to take down material that is clearly offensive 
(however that may be defined), in the interest of the First Amendment and maintaining 
their own impartial role, OSNs will generally not take down material that is merely 
embarrassing, purportedly defamatory, or shameful to its subject.  Resultantly, retribution 
for online personality harms has almost solely taken the form of “tit-for-tat” 
disparagement.  In one case, a young woman’s ex-boyfriend maliciously posted a clip of 
the two having sex that included all of her contact information.  In a modern-day twist on 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter, she resorted to creating a MySpace group 
advocating “chemically castrating” her ex-boyfriend and posted a picture of him with the 
word “loser” stamped across his forehead in bold red letters.57  This wild-west style 
vigilantism can escalate quickly and be overly harassing or defamatory.  In essence, 
anyone can post “their side” of a story without a bona fide verification process.  This 
digital “he said-she said” inevitably fails to exonerate but nevertheless remains as part of 
its participants’ digital identities. 
 
52 Facebook Principles, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Aug.  20, 2007) (The 
Principles go on to state: “We understand you may not want everyone in the world to have the information 
you share on Facebook; that is why we give you control of your information.”). 
53 Courts have affirmed the applicability of the law to OSNs like MySpace.  See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, 
Inc., 474 F.Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (dismissing an action against MySpace for harms arising from a 
minor’s sexual assault by a fellow MySpace member).   
54 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (e)(3) (2006) (The Communications Decency Act states that “[n]o provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider,” and expressly preempts any state law to the contrary.); 
Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The majority of federal circuits 
have interpreted the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.’” (quoting Zeran 
v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997))); see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 
339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2003)).   
55 See, e.g., MySpace Terms & Conditions, § 6(2), 8, 9, 
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited on Nov. 14, 2007); YouTube 
Terms and Conditions § 5.C, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Aug. 12, 2007).   
56 MySpace Terms & Conditions, § 5.G, 
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited on Nov.  14, 2007).   
57 Nussbaum, supra note 1. 
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V. ARGUMENT: WHY WE SHOULD PROTECT PRIVACY AND PERSONALITY ON OSNS 
¶33 I have defined the digital natives’ conception of privacy as anchored in anonymity, 
while the digital immigrants’ is based in control.  In truth, the digital form allows for 
neither complete anonymity nor control.  Regardless, the law, propounded and applied by 
digital immigrants, is firmly rooted in privacy as control, a notion that is no longer 
applicable and affords inadequate protection and adjudication to modern harms.  As such, 
we must reformulate and refocus the privacy debate, cutting through the thicket of moral 
panic and finger-pointing, to justify the protection of privacy on OSNs. 
¶34 To that end, the following are four compelling arguments militating for the 
protection of privacy and personality on OSNs and beyond.  Each carefully balances 
social welfare, public policy, and the realities of contemporary social networking 
technology. 
A. Identity  
¶35 Many digital immigrants perceive the OSN phenomenon as pathologically 
narcissistic and voyeuristic — yet another piece of evidence pointing to the obsessive 
self-importance of the Millenials, also known as Generation Me,  the Net Generation,58 59 
and the MySpace Generation,60 who foolishly trade away their privacy to “broadcast 
themselves” for the chance at unmerited celebrity. 
¶36 However, social networking profiles serve an important identity-building function: 
they are personal billboards representing one’s managed, researched, and well-crafted 
identity.  One reason for their success lies in their ability to allow the participant to easily 
mold identity and manage the way their world perceives them.  Profiles allow OSN 
participants to try on masks and test them among the focus group of their peers, a practice 
critical to socialization in teenagers and young adults. 
¶37 By divorcing the social world from physical space, they allow for communication 
without judgment based on appearance.  The OSN participant uploads a picture that 
represents his face in cyberspace — this may be anything from a flattering picture of 
himself to a picture of Superman — and thereby communicates with others.  This levels 
the playing field as identity is not judged in physical space terms of physical appearance, 
race, class, or body size — but in terms of interests, dialogue, and design. 
¶38 As noted OSN commentator danah boyd has remarked, with the dearth of 
unmediated physical spaces available to today’s youth (like the drive-in or the mall), 
OSNs provide a unique and valuable forum for identity creation and exploration.  
Affording privacy to these activities protects their crucial developmental purpose.  61
 
58 JEAN M. TWENGE, GENERATION ME: WHY TODAY’S YOUNG AMERICANS ARE MORE CONFIDENT, 
ASSERTIVE, ENTITLED — AND MORE MISERABLE THAN EVER BEFORE (2006).   
59 DON TAPSCOTT, GROWING UP DIGITAL: THE RISE OF THE NET GENERATION (1998) (predicting the 
future influence of the Net Generation, or N-Gen, in their unique position as the first generation to be 
immersed in the digital revolution from birth). 
60 Jessi Hempel with Paula Lehman, The MySpace Generation, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 12, 2005, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_50/b3963001.htm. 
61 danah boyd, Address at the American Association for the Advancement of Science: Identity 
Production in a Networked Culture: Why Youth Heart MySpace (Feb. 19, 2006), available at 
http://www.danah.org/papers/AAAS2006.html.   
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B. Dignity 
¶39 While, generally-speaking, the adult personality is not in such constant flux, it 
nevertheless warrants similar privacy protection.  Individuals assume different personae 
in social life that are often fundamentally incompatible with one another and often 
defined by time and space.62  In other words, people do not dress, behave, engage in the 
same conversations using the same words or language, or generally present themselves as 
the same “person” with everyone they know.  In a now-famous episode of the television 
show, Seinfeld, Jerry’s perpetual sidekick George Costanza posited the “Worlds Collide” 
theory, prompted by concern that his new girlfriend was infiltrating his group of friends.  
He ominously warned: 
I have ‘Relationship George’ but there is also ‘Independent George’ .  .  .  that is 
the George you know, the George you grew up with — that’s movie George, 
coffee shop George, liar George, bawdy George… if ‘Relationship George’ 
walks through this door, he will kill ‘Independent George’! A George divided 
against himself cannot stand!63
¶40 Behavioral science has long recognized that individuals need privacy to shield their 
multiple personalities from one another and “to explore different identities and develop a 
sense of autonomy.”   As one noted behavioral anthropologist has commented, 64
The fact that so few businessmen have offices in their homes cannot be solely 
explained on the basis of convention and top management’s uneasiness when 
executives are not visibly present.  I have observed that many men have two or 
more distinct personalities, one for business and one for the home.  The 
separation of office and home in these instances helps to keep the two often 
incompatible personalities from conflicting and may even serve to stabilize an 
idealized version of each which conforms to the projected image of both 
architecture and setting.65
¶41 As one U.S. court put it, privacy law should protect “an integral part of our 
humanity; one has a public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded 
and preserved.  The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives shall become 
public and which parts we shall hold close.”66  Consistent with this court’s dicta, scholars 
have noted that American society and jurisprudence places great importance on privacy 
as liberty while European societies tend to value privacy more in the context of personal 
inter-social interaction.   Therefore, European societies recognize the “right to a private 67
 
62 WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968) (concluding that a person’s behavior can 
more certainly be predicted from knowledge of the situation she is in rather than from her personality 
traits). 
63 Seinfeld: The Pool Guy (NBC television broadcast Nov. 16, 1995).   
64Dan Gibbard, Social Sites Can Aid Parents; Kids MayVventIissues Online, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 2007, 
at Metro 1 (quoting Justine Cassell, director of the center for Technology & Social Behavior at 
Northwestern University).   
65 EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 104-105 (Anchor Books 1990) (1966).   
66 Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).   
67 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001); James Q. Whitman, 
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161-1162 (2004); 
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life” as a fundamental matter of human dignity68 and are perhaps more apt to recognize 
situational personalities as healthy facets of human interaction that deserve privacy 
protection.  In the U.S., however, the sustainability of situational personalities is 
threatened by the loss of privacy on OSNs and the void in adjudication and recourses to 
the unwitting victims of cybershame.  Law and technology should recognize the 
importance of privacy in situational personalities on OSNs. 
C. Intimacy and Socialization 
¶42 As the digital immigrants would say, there is no doubt that the most effective way 
of controlling information about oneself is to keep it to oneself.  If you don’t want to run 
the risk of being wiretapped, don’t use the telephone.  Don’t want to run the significant 
risk of bodily injury? Don’t travel by automobile.  Don’t want your face PhotoShop’d 
onto a pornographic image? Don’t allow your picture to be taken.  While these arguments 
are certainly logical and prudent, when the technology becomes ubiquitous and central to 
the way society functions, these admonitions cease to be reasonable.  At their extreme, 
they are also both socially and psychologically undesirable. 
¶43 As many behavioral scientists and some legal theorists have noted, the voluntary 
disclosure of personal information and gossip about others are sources of intimacy and 
lead to healthy interpersonal relations.69  Intimacy enhances social welfare and promotes 
psychological and relational benefits like solace, kinship, and counsel.  Eminent privacy 
theorists have argued that without legal privacy protection, intimacy would not flourish 
or exist.70  For example, Professor Charles Fried theorizes that the act of sharing intimate 
information functions as a relationship-building commodity: 
To be friends or lovers persons must be intimate to some degree with each other.  
Intimacy is the sharing of information about one’s actions, beliefs or emotions 
which one does not share with all, and which one has the right not to share with 
anyone.  By conferring this right, privacy creates the moral capital which we 
spend in friendship and love.71
By fomenting strong interpersonal ties, privacy enhances intimacy and strengthens 
community. 
 
Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU, and Canada: The Allure of 
the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357 (2005).   
68 Avner Levin, Two Notions of Online Privacy: Facebook and Personal Information Protection 
(working paper, on file with author).   
69 CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 142 
(1970); Thomas E. Runge & Richard L. Archer, Reactions to the Disclosure of Public and Private Self-
Information, 44 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 357, 361 (1981) (discussing experimental findings in which subjects 
claim to like their stranger-partner more if the stranger-partner shares information that she claims she has 
not previously revealed).   
70 Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 
265, 265 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).  See also CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE, AND 
PRIVACY 42 (1977) (“In the area of personal relationships, such as family, friends, and lovers where quality 
is important, privacy is an operative principle.  These relationships can’t be sustained with everyone.  To 
function, they depend on an excluding condition.  Privacy creates the moral capital that is spent in 
friendship and intimate relations.”).   
71 FRIED, supra note 69. 
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¶44 Such disclosure is the lifeblood of OSNs.  The immense success of OSNs has 
stemmed from their ability to simulate real-life social interaction, allow old friends to 
keep in touch, and thereby recreate intimacy and community online.  This success and 
laudable goal would be undermined if some degree of privacy were not protected on 
OSNs. 
D. Discourse 
¶45 The more people hear stories of others getting “busted” on OSNs, the less likely 
they will be to share their stories and opinions, and thus continue to develop OSNs as a 
platform for communication and meaningful social interaction.  OSNs are the latest wave 
of Internet technologies to successfully bring people of similar interests together with few 
or no transaction costs.  This has led to the swelling of political and social activism on 
OSNs among an age demographic that has traditionally been criticized for its apathy.72  
Even presidential candidates have swarmed to OSNs to rally support among the wired 
generation.73  Many political and social groups’ successes at bringing people together 
could only have been made possible with the networking power of OSNs.  To some, this 
begs a troubling question: what happens to political and social discourse and activism 
when it is engraved in the indelible memory of the digital form?  What happens to our 
freedom of association? 
¶46 Recording something in electronic form facilitates monitoring without the 
transience of human memory.74  Present or future voyeurs can easily attain a detailed, 
often first-hand account of personal facts that occurred years before.  Digital dossiers 
may serve to ensure that people are perpetually tagged and identified by activities in 
which they engaged years ago.  We can no longer erase or ignore our pasts. 
¶47 Such surveillance changes behavior.  Awareness of monitoring can make a person 
feel extremely uncomfortable and ultimately lead to self-censorship, inhibition, and a 
chilling of discourse.  As Justice Douglas observed, “monitoring, if prevalent, certainly 
kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.”75  Although the rapidly rising number of 
profiles and seeming ubiquity of OSNs does not appear to indicate that this chilling effect 
has taken place, several recent cases — both in the courts and in folklore — have tested 
the boundaries of speech on OSNs and have served as a warning that such speech can 
have physical space consequences.76  University administrators reportedly troll OSNs 
when investigating illegal activities on campuses.  Employers are notoriously looking at 
OSNs for quick and easy background checks on prospective employees that may 
constitute a basis for discriminating against them due to their past activities or political 
views.   Some are using OSN postings to publicly shame others’ political views and 77
 
72 A MySpace group called “dollarsfordarfur,” recently founded by two high school students, raised both 
awareness and significant funds for the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.  See dollarsfordarfur, 
http://www.myspace.com/dollarsfordarfur (last visited Oct.  26, 2007).   
73 See Alex Williams, The Future President, On Your Friends List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, 
available at http://nytimes.com/2007/03/18/fashion/18myspace.html. 
74 See Lessig, supra note 9.   
75 U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).   
76 See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23406 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 
2007); Requa v. Kent School District No. 415, 492 F. Supp 2d 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2007).   
77 Davis, supra note 11; Coutu, supra note 14. 
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opinions or to judge them based on their OSN associations, networks, and friends.78  
Reports abound of organizations acting swiftly to hush criticism of them on OSNs.79  In 
order to allow for free association and exchange of ideas, OSN members must maintain 
the ability to disclose or opine without fear of mass disclosure or retaliation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶48 While reputational harms are more tangible and indelible than ever before, there is 
a dearth of support for the aggrieved.  Our current law is ill-equipped to protect these 
injuries, ISPs are unwilling to mediate them, codes of ethics are scant, and technology is 
still too fragile to protect them.  For digital immigrants, this lack of protection and redress 
is justified, after all, online, “you have zero privacy — get over it.”80  While a prudent 
personal admonition, it is too simplistic and cynical to inform the law, public policy, 
ethics, or the future of technology. 
¶49 In order to analyze the shortcomings in this area, it is necessary to sidestep the 
cyber-immigration debate and understand the personal, relational, and social benefits of 
protecting privacy and personality on OSNs and beyond.  Individuals need privacy to 
develop and sustain personality, strengthen interpersonal relationships, voice and test 
opinions, become producers of culture, and, ultimately, be free. 
¶50 The burden of protecting privacy on OSNs should not be solely borne by the OSN 
participants, rather it should be shared by the individuals, law, ethics, ISPs, and 
technology.  Individuals should be cognizant of the reality of digital information and 
prudent in their selections of ISPs, privacy controls, and self-disclosure without assuming 
entitlement to selective anonymity.  The law must also be updated to address modern 
harms, perhaps by incorporating a reasonable expectation of audience standard or a 
uniform code of privacy for adoption by state legislatures.  Codes of ethics addressing 
dignitary harms on OSNs should be promulgated, perhaps encouraging employers to 
disclose the sources of an employee’s background check and allow opportunity to refute 
any questionable online information. 
¶51 Finally, ISPs, who are perhaps the best situated actors to carry some of these 
burdens, should proactively educate their users as to the risks inherent in online 
disclosure, incorporate a code of online ethics to which participants can subscribe, and 
perhaps offer an active adjudication system for member privacy disputes.  ISPs can also 
tailor the technology to protect situational personalities, perhaps allowing the online 
socializer to zone his personality as he can in real space.  Protecting privacy and 
personality on OSNs from various angles and by several actors would ensure that the 
 
78 See Wikipedia Facebook entry, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook (last visted Oct. 26, 2007) 
(listing reported incidents). 
79 See, e.g., Chris Williams, University Moves to Hush Facebook Criticism, THE REGISTER (U.K.), May 
22, 2007, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/22/keele_facebook (documenting the policies 
of English universities that have threatened students who criticize them online).   
80 Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems, famously retorted this statement to a group of reporters 
and analysts at an event to launch his company’s Jini technology in January of 1999.  See Polly Sprenger, 
Sun on Privacy: ‘Get over it’, WIRED, Jan. 26, 1999, available at 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538.  He has since claimed that the “zinger” was 
misconstrued and oversimplified as a sound bite.  Don Tennant, Q&A: McNealy defends Sun reliability, 
personal privacy views, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 27, 2001, available at 
http://www.computerworld.com/hardwaretopics/hardware/story/0,10801,66102,00.html.   
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technology evolves in ways that encourage identity-building, intimacy, and social 
discourse, yet simultaneously protect and respect its participants. 
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